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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between self-governance through board members and firm performance. 
Results of this study revealed significant relationships only between some board characteristics and some measures of financial 
performance. Overall, the findings indicate that board members are not promoting good governance in their organizations. This 
indicates the need of a specific governance framework to guide board members of nonprofit organisations (NPOs) to engage in 
good self-governance for the benefits of the NPOs and their relevant stakeholders. 
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1. Introduction 
In the current economic environment, many non-profit organizations (NPO) are facing funding cuts and reduced 
voluntary donations. While many NPOs are facing the reductions in income, the demand for their services continues to 
grow (Cornforth, 2012). In this context, Charity Governance Review (2013) by Grant Thornton proposes that good 
governance practice is crucial as it can facilitates NPOs to respond effectively and timely to meet emerging challenges 
and in turn continue to deliver their social objectives. At an organizational level, the board or the trustees are 
responsible to ensure that good governance is being practiced. Good governance promotes compliance with the law, 
transparency and the overall effectiveness of the NPOs (e.g. Cornforth, 2012 and Ostrower, 2007). This infers an 
important link between the governing body of the NPOs, the board and organizational effectiveness. From a resource 
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dependence theory (RDT) perspective, organizational effectiveness can be achieved through effective boards. The RDT 
literature contends that board members are associated with various skills and expertise that will enable them to manage 
the flow of resources and reduces the uncertainty in their environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Hence, this study 
aims to examine the relationship between board composition and organizational effectiveness as a measure of value 
creation in non-profit organizations.  
While good governance has been recognized to be an important element for effective functioning of the NPOs, the 
current governance framework in many countries are not legislated (Cornforth, 2012). Nevertheless, Cornforth (2012) 
argued that the contemporary thinking about non-profit governance originated in legislation aimed at businesses. Hence, 
this study contends that good governance through self-governance in NPOs is expected to influence organisational 
effectiveness. In line with the current proposition, good governance in this study focuses on board composition. 
Findings from this study contribute to policy formulation by regulators in promoting self-governance in the non-profit 
sector.  
This paper will proceed with the review of past literature from which hypotheses will be developed. The paper will 
then proceed to the empirical stage of variable measurement, sampling, data analysis and discussion of results. The final 
part of this paper presents the conclusion, limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Generation 
 
2.1 Resource dependence theory, board composition and firm performance 
 
The growing number of NPOs and the current economic environment has lead to reductions in income to many 
NPOs around the world. According to resource dependence theory (RDT), an organization operating in this 
environment will survive if they can reduce the uncertainty in their environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The RDT 
contends that board of directors enable organizations to minimize dependence on resources or gain resources in 
ensuring optimal delivery of their social objectives. In other words, the boards are exercising good or strong governance 
in overseeing the delivery of the organisation’s strategy as well as safeguarding the assets of the NPOs. Prior empirical 
evidence suggests that characteristics or compositions of board members are associated with organizational 
effectiveness (e.g. Pfeffer, 1973 and Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Hence, this study focuses on four types of board 
composition: board size, board professionalism, board members with political connections and ethnic minority on 
boards.  
 
2.1.2 Board size and firm performance 
 
The RDT literature suggests that board size in NPOs is likely to vary with the amount of complexity and uncertainty 
in the external environment (Boyd, 1990; Dess and Beard, 1984; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). For 
example, more board members with link to important resources in the external environment will be recruited on the 
boards of NPOs. This suggests that the size of the board in NPOs is likely to be fairly large. Proponents of small board 
size argued that large board size reduces effective communication, coordination, decision making process and the 
ability to control, monitor and supervise organisational activity (e.g. Yermack, 1996 and Mak and Kusnadi, 2005). 
However, this study argues that in order to effectively sustain an organization in meeting the current challenges facing 
the NPOs, larger boards are more likely to be able to fulfill these obligations as they are more likely to be comprised of 
members with various experience, expertise, knowledge and experience. Based on this reasoning, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
 
H1: The size of the board is significantly positively related to firm performance.  
 
 
2.1.3 Board professionalism and firm performance 
 
The human capital of the board members consists of experience, expertise and reputation (Brown, 2005) and this can 
facilitate them to guide the strategic direction of the NPOs. Mwenja and Lewis (2009) argue that these board members 
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are an important resource to the NPOs as they are more capable in directing the strategic mission of the organization. 
Hence, it is expected that board members with professional backgrounds are more capable to assist the NPOs in 
analysing and understanding the complex environment under which the NPOs operate. In addition to their experience 
and expertise, board members with professional backgrounds are expected to be concerned with maintaining and 
enhancing their reputation. The reputation of professionally qualified board members is associated with their 
membership in the professional bodies. In general, they are obliged to comply with their professional commitments 
(Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004) as well as other legal compliance. Overall, they are more likely to contribute to the 
exercise of good governance with consequent positive impact on firm performance. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
developed: 
 
H2:  The percentage of board members with professional affiliations is significantly positively related to firm 
performance.  
 
2.1.4 Political connections and firm performance 
 
In managing emerging challenges, particularly in sustaining the flow of income into the organisation, it is important 
that the organisation develops and maintains healthy relationships with the various stakeholders (Mwenja and Lewis, 
2009). Mwenja and Lewis (2009) argue that through these relationships or external social networks, the organization 
will be able to expand the organisation’s donor base and consequently bring in resources into the organization. This 
argument is in line with the evidence provided by past studies where board members with political connections are 
associated with preferential access to funds (e.g. Claessons, Feijen and Leaven, 2008; Faccio, Masulis, McConnell, 
2006). In relation to maintaining the network ties with the various governmental agencies and regulatory authorities, the 
board members are expected to be more supportive of the various calls for good self-governance in NPOs promoted by 
these bodies. In this context, this increases the board members involvement in strategic decisions (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001). Overall, this infers that these board members will be able to make more meaningful contributions in 
enhancing the governance of NPOs and enhanced firm performance. Following this argument, the following hypothesis 
is developed: 
 
H3:  The percentage of board members with political connections is significantly positively related to firm 
performance.  
 
2.1.5 Ethnic minority representations on board and firm performance 
 
As NPOs exist to deliver social objectives to the society, some studies argue that board diversity offers a 
representation of the diverse stakeholders which is in line with the function of the board in protecting the interests of 
stakeholders and society at large (e.g. Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003 and Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). These 
literatures argue that board diversity increases discussion, exchange of ideas and the overall performance of the board. 
As Malaysia is a multiracial country, it is expected that the board members to be diverse. This study refers to ethnic 
minority representations as represented by non-Bumiputra board members. While studies on the relationship between 
board diversity and various measures of firm performance in Malaysia provides inconclusive evidence (e.g. Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Ramasamy, Ling and Ting, 2007), this study expects representations of ethnic minority on the boards of 
NPOs are associated with higher firm performance. In line with past studies in Malaysia, this study argues that 
Bumiputra board members practice selective governance practices and this can reduce the overall effectiveness of the 
governance framework within the NPOs. Following this argument, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H4: The percentage of ethnic minority on boards is significantly positively related to firm performance.  
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
 
The sample consists of 250 NPOs registered with the Registrar of Societies (ROS) for the financial year 2010. The 
research approach involves the content analysis of societies’ annual reports. The sample selected comprises of NPOs 
registered in the States of Selangor, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, Terengganu, Kelantan, Sabah, Kedah, Perak 
and Johor.   
 
3.2 Measurement of variables 
 
3.2.1 Independent variables 
 
There are four independent variables in this study, board size, board members with professional affiliations, board 
members with political connections and ethnic minority representations on board. In addition to the identified 
independent variables, this study also includes size as a control variable. The definition and measurement of variables 
used in this study are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Definition and measurement of variables 
 
Variable  
Acronym 
Definition Measurement 
B_SIZE Board size Total number of board members. 
B_PROF Board members with  
professional affiliations 
Percentage of board members with professional affilitations to total number of board 
members. 
Professional affiliation refers to members with professions in areas such as accounting
management, engineering, architecture and medical. 
B_POL Board members with  
political connections 
ercentage of board members with political connections to total number of board  
members. 
olitical connections refer to members being conferred awards by the Government of 
Malaysia. For example, board members with Dato’, Tan Sri and Datuk Paduka. 
B_EM Ethnic minority representations 
board 
Percentage of non-Bumiputra on board to total number of board members.  
SIZE Size of society Natural log of total assets 
 
3.2.2 Firm performance 
 
Firm performance measurement in this study is adopted from Winand, Zintz, and Scheerder (2012) and Abraham 
(2006). Following these literatures, firm performance is classified into financial balance and mission based financial 
support. The definition and measurement of firm performance used in this study are listed in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Definition and measurement of firm performance 
 
Variable  
Acronym 
Definition Measurement 
 
FB1 
 
Financial balance 
Measure financial stability of organization 
 
Ratios of benefits 
=Total revenue / total expense 
 
FB2 
 
Financial balance 
Measure financial stability of organization 
 
Ratios of  benefits in comparison with revenues 
=Net revenue / total revenue 
 
FS 
 
Mission based financial support 
Measure whether financial resources are sufficient and  
available to support mission of the organisation 
 
Primary reserve ratio  
= organization operating commitments 
= net current assets /total expenses 
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4. Analysis and Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics on the dependent variable, FV. The results of the descriptive statistics for 
continuous independent variables and control variable are presented in Table 4. 
 
   Table 3. Descriptive statistics for firm performance 
 
Number of NPOs = 250 
Firm Performance (%) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
FB1 0.000 8.198 1.387 1.091 
FB2 -37.420 1.000 -0.155 2.464 
FS -4.113 94.037 3.831 8.970 
 
Table 3 indicates that the mean value of 3.831% for FS is the highest relative to the mean values for FB1 and FB2. 
The mean value of -0.155% for FB2 indicates that the nett revenues of the NPOs in the sample are very low.  
 
        Table 4: Descriptive statistics for independent and control variables 
 
Number of NPOs = 250 
Independent and Control variables  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
B_SIZE  4.00 33.00 13.74 5.39 
B_PROF (%) 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.23 
B_POL (%) 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.15 
B_EM (%) 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.42 
SIZE (RM'000) 0.00 33,242,464.00 883,627.45 3,098,781.35 
 
Table 4 reported that board size of NPOs ranges from a minimum of 4 members to 33 members. Consistent with 
prior studies (Boyd, 1990; Dess and Beard, 1984; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), this result indicates 
that some NPOs are fairly large in size. In relation to board composition, Table 4 reported that some NPOs have 100% 
members with professional affiliations, 100% board members with political connections and 100% ethnic representation 
on board. Finally, Table 4 reported that some NPOs are very small with no revenue to a fairly large size NPO with 
maximum revenue of RM33, 242,464.00. 
 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
In this study, linear multiple regression is used as the basis of analysis for testing H1 to H4. The hypothesized 
relationships are modeled as follows. 
 
FB1 = β0 + β1B_SIZE + β2B_PROF + β3B_POL + β4B_EM + β4SIZE + εt      (1) 
FB2 = β0 + β1B_SIZE + β2B_PROF + β3B_POL + β4B_EM + β4SIZE + εt      (2) 
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FS   = β0 + β1B_SIZE + β2B_PROF + β3B_POL + β4B_EM + β4SIZE + εt     (3) 
 
where variable definitions are given in Table 1.   
 
In the above regression models, multicollinearity was tested using the variance inflation factor and tolerance levels, 
and found to be well within the satisfactory range. The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 5 and are 
now discussed in terms of tests of each of the hypotheses.  
 
Table 5: Multiple regression results for factors affecting the firm performance 
 
Dependent Variable Financial Balance Mission Based Financial Support 
FB1 FB2 FS 
R2 0.050 0.046 0.136 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.026 0.118 
F 2.564 2.346 7.660 
Sig 0.028 0.042 0.000 
Model Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
(constant) 0.000 0.193 0.847 0.000 0.164 0.870 0.000 0.103 0.918 
BOD_SIZE -0.042 -0.652 0.515 -0.089 -1.390 0.166 -0.087 -1.145 0.158 
BOD_PROF 0.050 0.780 0.436 0.056 0.874 0.383 0.126 2.074 0.039 
BOD_POL -0.182 -2.736 0.007 -0.157 -2.360 0.019 -0.168 -2.648 0.009 
BOD_EM -0.101 -1.523 0.129 -0.066 -1.002 0.317 -0.070 -1.105 0.270 
SIZE 0.189 2.762 0.006 0.174 2.538 0.012 0.360 5.504 0.000 
 
Results of the multiple regression analysis in Table 5 report that the adjusted R2 is 0.031, 0.026 and 0.118 
respectively. H1 predicts that B_SIZE is significantly positively related to various measures of firm performance. The 
results in Table 5 reveal insignificant relationships. Hence, HI is rejected. These results indicate that B_SIZE board 
composition instead of size matters in ensuring good governance and firm performance. This is consistent with prior 
studies where type of directors on the board is associated with different benefits to the organizations (Luoma and 
Goodstein, 1999; Johnson and Greening, 1999). Hence, an optimum board compositions instead of board size that 
matters in contributing to firm performance.  
With regards to board members with professional affiliations, the results in Table 5 reveal significant relationship 
only with FS. Hence, H2 is partially accepted. H2 posits that B_POL are obliged to comply with their professional 
commitments and are more likely to direct their organisation to engage in strategic activities in line with delivery of 
social objectives. However, these results indicate that B_POL are more concerned with safeguarding the financial 
resources of the organization in order to meet its mission and not engaging in more strategic actions to enhance other 
measures of firm performance.   
H3 predicts B_POL is significantly related with firm performance through their networking with the various 
stakeholders. Table 5 reported significant negative relationships between B_POL and FB1, FB2 and FS. Hence, H3 is 
rejected. It is possible that the unavailability of specific governance framework for NPOs in Malaysia leads these board 
members in opposite directions with negative impact on firm performance.  Finally, H4 predicts that B_EM is 
significantly positively related to various measures of firm performance. The results in Table 5 reveal insignificant 
relationships. Hence, H4 is rejected. Even though the descriptive statistic results revealed that most of the board 
members in the sample are represented by ethnic minority, this does not contribute to better firm performance. A 
possible explanation for this insignificant relationship can be consistent with the explanation with regards to the 
relationships between B_POL and firm performance. This point is significant to the need of a specific governance 
framework to guide board members of NPOs to engage in good self-governance for the benefits of the NPOs and their 
relevant stakeholders.   
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5. Conclusion and Limitations 
 
This study examines the relationships between various board compositions and various measures of firm 
performance. The findings in this study provide two main inferences. First, the insignificant positive relationships 
between most board characteristics and firm performance indicates lack of guidance with regards to best practice of 
good governance specifically for NPOs. It is important to acknowledge this issue as it can reduce the board members 
effectiveness in meeting various challenges faced by NPOs. The second inference is related to the insignificant 
relationships between B_SIZE and firm performance. This indicates that an optimum mix of board members is 
paramount in ensuring good governance in order to enhance firm performance.  
Finally, there are some limitations in this study. First, this study focuses on only four board characteristics. Future 
research may consider other board characteristics as well as other measures of firm performance. The practice of good 
governance can also be measured based on questionnaires sent to board members or members of the NPOs. Despite 
these limitations, this study provides useful insights in understanding the relationships between various board 
characteristics in measuring the practice of self-governance and performance of NPOs in a developing country 
environment.  
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